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“Ultimate” facts?  Zalabardo on the Metaphysics of Truth 
Juliet Floyd, Boston University1 
 
1.   Introduction 
The story of how Wittgenstein managed to halt Russell’s development of the “multiple 
relation theory of judgment” (hereafter “MRTJ”) during 1912-13, and how Russell’s 
development of the view shaped Wittgenstein’s Tractatus idea of propositions as pictures [1921, 
hereafter “TLP”], have been the subject of a great deal of literature.  José Zalabardo’s writings 
on these issues—extensive, detailed and lucid—have substantially deepened our understanding 
[ed. 2012, 2015].  
The present essay develops this earlier work, construing the Tractatus idea of picturing as a 
direct and fundamental answer to a problem Zalabardo∂ identified earlier as central to the 
Russell-Wittgenstein MRTJ debate, what he (following Russell) calls the “mode of combination 
problem” [ed. 2012: Introduction; 2015].  On Zalabardo’s view, the Tractatus conception of 
propositions as pictures overturns Russell’s answer to his problem: its role is ontological, 
replacing one kind of fundamental object with another. In Section 2. below I shall question 
whether Zalabardo has really reached the most “fundamental” aspect of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
response to Russell and the MRTJ.   Here I draw modality into the story, as he does not.  In 
Section 3. I explain how we might deepen his analysis of the problems by connecting them with 
wider methodological aspirations of the Tractatus—those Zalabardo wants to abstract away 
from, but which were in fact, as I see it, crucial to Wittgenstein’s response to Russell.  
 Certainly the origins of the MRTJ are metaphysical.  Beginning in [1906], dissatisfied 
with his earlier, Moorean conception of propositions as ultimate entities, Russell proposed a way 
to eliminate these from his ontology, applying the technique for eliminating definite descriptions.  
Phrases such as “the proposition that Othello believed when he saw Cassio and Desdemona 
together” were to be analyzed away as incomplete, non-designating symbols, replaced with 
assertions about objects and relations in relations with one another.   
                                               
1 I am indebted to Sanford Shieh for many stimulating conversations over the years about the MRTJ.  I would also 
like to thank Max Weiss and the students in my fall 2016 Tractatus seminar at Boston University for their responses.  
The students in Warren Goldfarb’s Harvard Tractatus seminar 11/29/2017 gave me helpful feedback on a draft of 
this comment. Last but not least, Akihiro Kanamori and an anonymous referee gave me sage advice on the 
penultimate version.  
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The challenge is of course to explain how such an analysis is to account for the roles of 
propositions: the particular objects of our judgment and belief, with their samenesses and 
differences, some of which are true, some of which are false, and all of which are either true or 
false, but not both.  
 In the MRTJ Russell analyzed the tragic fact that, mistakenly, “Othello judges that 
Desdemona loves Cassio” in this way, as a judgment-fact: 
 J(o, d, c, loves)  
And not in this way, as a relation of judgment to a fact: 
 J(o, <d, c, loves>).  
In the latter analysis, the complex judged would be contained in the judgment-fact, necessitating 
an objective falsehood-complex.  But in the former, this is not so.  According to Russell’s 
analysis, we can say that the judgment Othello makes is true if there exists a complex of 
Desdemona loving Cassio, and false if not, there being no need for the actual existence of a “not-
complex” in the latter case.   
This is a correspondence theory of truth, but, crucially, there is no medium or vehicle of 
representation figuring in the analysis, only a greater than 2-ary relation in the judgment fact, 
which is of finite complexity.2  By the time of Principia Mathematica [Whitehead and Russell 
1910], as we shall see below, Russell clarified this point, replacing his initial framing talk of 
“ideas” (in his [1906]) with talk of “objects”.3 On the MRTJ, truth is a property of actual 
judgment-facts (complexes), not of sentences: it is “an ingenious view”, built up, as Schlick 
would later write, “wholly out of relations” [1925: 68], but—something to which Schlick 
objected—the theory lacks any working general notion of correspondence or interpretation.  For 
there is nothing beyond the actual entities of acquaintance whose arrangements are involved in 
judgment.4  
                                               
2 Ramsey, Wittgenstein and Gödel would later attend to this finitary idealization as something of crucial import; 
Russell only noted it [cf. Floyd and Kanamori 2016].  Wittgenstein later (regretfully) told Kreisel that he had 
worked only on the finite case in the Tractatus, thinking that the infinite case “would take care of itself” [Marion 
1998: 34].  Wittgenstein’s approach was intensional and predicative. [Floyd 2001] discusses what happens if there 
are an infinite number of (finitely complex) elementary propositions; [Weiss 2017] analyzes the complexity of the 
consequence relation given a predicative reading of Wittgenstein’s “form-series” variable [TLP 4.1273, 5.501].   
3 I take the “Humean” remark in Theory of Knowledge discussed by Zalabardo [Russell 1913: 140] to register the 
importance of this point. 
4 [Russell 1912a] chapter XII ventured that an act of judging unifies the whole complex, but he withdrew this in the 
face of Stout’s successful objection that this simply reverts to the original Moorean theory [Zalabardo ed. 2012: 4ff].      
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In his [2015: Chapter 2] Zalabardo expresses the “the mode of combination” problem this 
way:  
Understanding requires grasp not only of the objects in the world that the proposition 
represents as combined with one another, but also of the way in which these objects are 
represented as combined with one another [my emphasis].  
 
This “way” cannot be a further constituent or object of judgment, on penalty of regress.  For the 
demand for an answer to the particular way in which such a constituent itself combines would 
then have to be explicated, and the game would never end.   This problem of “unity” is insoluble 
along Russellian lines, Zalabardo argues, and this was, he claims, the fundamental point of 
Wittgenstein’s conceiving propositions as picture-facts: they are non-compound facts. 
 In several respects Zalabardo’s reading is uncontroversial.  It builds on Russell’s own 
idea of the role of a “mode of combination” [1904: 98].  It reconstructs regress arguments 
Russell himself explicitly set forth about the difficulty of conceiving forms as nothing but further 
constituents [1912b: 55].  And it emphasizes the impact of Frege’s idea of the multiple-
analyzability of propositions, their kind of logical priority, on the Tractatus: a conception of 
analysis quite different from Russell’s [Levine 2002].  It can hardly be disputed that Wittgenstein 
embraces the idea that what is to count as an object in logic depends upon an analysis of 
propositions and their logical relations to one another.  
 But in the present paper Zalabardo goes farther.  He takes the non-compound ontological 
nature of facts to be the best virtue of the picture-conception, the primary thing that must have 
made it seem truly compelling to the young Wittgenstein.  It was able to look like the only way 
forward when he wrote the Tractatus because of the regress arguments. 
 I would like to urge an alternative conception of fundamentality in the Tractatus’s 
relation to Russell.  It is a conception many of even the very best readers of the Tractatus have 
missed, and not for trivial, but for deeply historical reasons.  It is this: modality is central to the 
picture conception’s overturning of the MRTJ; it is as a matter of fact fundamental to the whole 
Tractatus [cf. Shieh 2014, Manuscript for a similar stance].   
 It is not, as so many have held, that Wittgenstein aimed to eliminate the notions of 
“possibility”, “necessity” and so on as hopeless from logic and philosophy, transforming them 
into something “merely linguistic”.  Nor did he regard such modal ideas metaphysically. I am not 
suggesting that he was advocating Kantian ideas either—though I believe he was offering a 
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transformation of Kantian problematics.  Instead, one should take Wittgenstein to be self-
consciously drawing the ideas of possibility and necessity and our capacities in to early analytic 
philosophy, in to our conception of the logical, precisely so as to transform them [cf. Dreben and 
Floyd 1991; Floyd 2007].  Eliminating this aspect of his project misses what Wittgenstein takes 
to be fundamental, primordial, in his conception of thoughts as logical pictures [cf. TLP 3].  
Most interestingly of all, it leaves us powerless to comprehend what Wittgenstein is doing vis à 
vis Frege and Russell as an internal criticism and development of their approaches.  Zalabardo’s 
essay stumbles here, as I see it.   But he stumbles at a very deep point.  The issue of 
fundamentality, of primordiality, is the key here, and he deserves credit for bringing it to our 
attention. 
 A crucial remark in this respect is TLP 2.003, that “form is the possibility of structure” 
(my emphasis).  This requisite modalized distinction between form and structure was added to 
Wittgenstein’s manuscript after the Prototractatus [cf. Wittgenstein 1989].  It expresses a crucial 
innovative step that plays a central role in Wittgenstein’s conception of sentences as pictures.  
Zalabardo entirely suppresses it: most of his argumentation goes against taking the distinction 
seriously.5  Why?  My best guess is that it is because Zalabardo aims to bring Wittgenstein into 
direct confrontation with Russell, but at the same time he refuses to budge from a narrow 
conception of Russell’s struggles.  And he therefore underestimates how keen and sensitive a 
philosophical reader Wittgenstein was of Russell.  In a sense he does not bring Wittgenstein 
close enough to Russell: they touch in ways Zalabardo says they do, but there is something 
missing. 
 What is missing is something methodological, a conception of the task of philosophy 
itself.  In the end, Zalbardo suppresses the extent to which the Tractatus owes a serious 
methodological debt to Russell, one expressed in Russell’s “supreme scientific maxim in 
scientific philosophy”: “Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for 
inferred entities” [1914: VI].  Zalabardo rests with inferred entities.  Yet Wittgenstein is 
developing and generalizing Russell’s maxim in the Tractatus, urging us onward, in his own 
way. He too is urging upon his readers an injunction: Where it is possible to transform questions 
of metaphysical necessity into step-by-step formal procedures whose generality can be written 
                                               
5 He has heard this criticism before; see [Kang 2016], [Appleqvist 2017], both reviews of [Zalabardo 2015]. 
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down and expressed, do so, for then we have gotten to where we can see logical relations rightly. 
Propositions are shown in constructions in the Tractatus, just as pictures and possibilities are. 
We “make” these [2.1].  But what do we make?  And how?  And why? These are all good 
questions. 
 
2.  Counting “Ways” and Unities 
 There are two forms of the problem of “unity” according to Zalabardo, one 
“metaphysical” and one “semantical”.  He takes these to be separable from one another—as well 
as from Wittgenstein’s wider views about “kicking the ladder” that have confronted interpreters 
for over 20 years.  I want to question these separations in what follows, stressing the 
interconnections.  
 Zalabardo’s “metaphysical problem” raises the question of what it is for a fact to obtain, 
and establishes that only a conception according to which facts (propositions being facts) are 
actual fundamental unities, rather than compounds of further constituents, can account for truth 
and falsity in judgment. The “semantical problem” raises the question how we are to construe 
our mental capacity to single out the way in which the objects combine in a fact, when it obtains.   
What is singled out in “consciousness” as the “mode” of combination cannot, according to 
Zalabardo, itself be an object, on penalty of regress of logical forms.  Thus we are forced to take 
propositions, rather than objects, to be metaphysically fundamental pieces of the “furniture of 
the universe”.  Objects are comparative, logical “features” of facts that we have the mental 
capacity to discern, not constituents of which propositions or facts are composed.  Objects are 
therefore, Zalabardo holds, not fundamental to the metaphysical or semantical aspects of the 
picturing idea. 
 In Zalabardo’s example, to judge that Pavarotti sings is not simply to single out Pavarotti 
and singing and the idea of predicating a property of an object, but, rather, to regard the way 
Pavarotti and singing are combined as instantiating a form of monadic predication (φx).  Our 
capacity to so regard the fact is lodged in our ability to compare features of facts, to see Pavarotti 
and singing as instantiating patterns instantiated elsewhere, e.g., in our judging that Jay Z raps.  
This is to be conceived as exercising a more fundamental capacity than our grasping of 
constituents.   
 But what about our grasp of samenesses among a variety of collections of thoughts — 
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say, about Pavarotti?  Zalabardo’s answer is that we have the capacity to be shown such internal 
connections because we can say that Pavarotti and singing are configured “like that”, reflecting 
on our judgment that Jay Z raps. This in turn directly solves the “semantical” problem, for 
Zalabardo: how we can judge what is not so.  We are able to combine pictorial elements of 
Pavarotti and rapping in the same way as we combine pictorial elements of Jay Z and rapping to 
reach the (false) judgment that Pavarotti raps. 
 The negative part of Zalabardo’s metaphysical conclusion, that propositions cannot be 
taken to be mere compounds of actual objects, is surely there to be seen in the Tractatus. 
Wittgenstein is explicit that he is thinking of pictures (propositions) as configurations of 
elements [Konfigurationen, TLP 2.0271], not “compounds”.   Yet here, I suggest, no choice is 
better. Why do we have to decide which is prior, the object or the picture as a whole 
configuration of elements, a whole structure [Struktur, 2.032]?  And how is this supposed to 
explain or ground the distinction between true and false belief?  I am not persuaded by the 
particular story that Zalabardo tells here. 
 To deny the fundamental work that object does in our conception of propositions as 
configurations seems to echo a Bradleyan metaphysics, according to which we only ever always 
judge reality partly, and never wholly.  If all I ultimately use to explicate my understanding of 
logical relations are cognitive episodes of analogy (“like that”), since every analogy is partial, we 
never simply judge logical relations, tout court.  Wittgenstein hedges his bets, reasoning only 
from conditionals: if things can occur in states of affairs [2.0121]; if  all objects are given 
[2.0124]; if we know objects [2.01231], if I understand the proposition [TLP 2.0124, 4.021]).  
But why does he do this? 
 What is needed is a better sense of generality to gauge the force of these “ifs”.  And to 
get that into view, Wittgenstein always (early, middle and late) stressed the importance of step-
by-step procedures that are expressed in logic.  If judgment requires, not only a singling out of 
those objects that are the objects of judgment, but also grasp of the way in which the objects 
would have to be represented as combined, if the proposition is true, then, it seems, we must be 
able to make sense of how the mind grasps this “way”.  In the example discussed, we need to 
explore how it is that we get from a picture of Jay Z rapping to the form of monadic predication, 
φx or for that matter to Ω(Jay Z), the concept of all concepts that hold of him, or to any of the 
relations in which he stands, such as hearing, jumping, recording a rap, performing a rap, and so 
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on and so forth.  These differing relations will instantiate indefinitely many forms or ways.  The 
Tractatus’s idea is that here it is the whole system that counts, the systematic procedures we use 
in going from here to there, not cognitive episodes in isolation.  It is the route of the journey, the 
procedures, and not the destinations, that count. 
     It had better not be that, in the end, the “way” grasped is a mode of actual truth.  For 
there is no such thing as the way of being true that Othello judges that Desdemona loves Cassio 
evinces, as opposed to some other way of being true for some other judgment.  If we say “like 
that”, pointing at another proposition, we are not then pointing at actual truth, or modes of truth, 
but rather giving a comparison. Which one?  If we are pointing at actual configurations, then the 
semantical problem of differentiating true from false judgment arises, for are not false 
propositions utterly different from true ones in the “way” they are put together?  If not why not?    
 On Zalabardo’s account, it is not explained how we are able to go from grasp of a false 
judgment (e.g., that Russell raps) to a grasp of the logical form of a true judgment (that Jay Z 
raps): the “like” is too ambiguous.  And even more than this: it is surely left open as a possibility 
in the Tractatus that all of our affirmations of non-compound sentences (the “atomic” ones) are 
false.  How then are comparisons of features to get us where we need to go?  It seems that either 
we are saddled with a wholly un-unified conception of truth and/or have begged the question of 
the distinction between truth and falsity, or else we are offering an account of logic unified by a 
mysterious notion of “form” (“like this”) that does not have the power to make logic intelligible.  
 The difficulty of what I shall call the primordiality of truth is serious. The trouble arises 
for Zalabardo’s seeing-as even in the Tractatus itself, right at the point where the MRTJ is under 
discussion, with Wittgenstein’s problematic use of the Necker Cube to discuss perception [TLP 
5.5423].  In that remark, Wittgenstein says that we see “two different facts”.  And to show this he 
helps himself to two parameters, a and b, labeling the two directions in which we can “see” the 
cube, one “facing downwards” (the a-in-the-front way), one “facing upwards” (the b-in-the-front 
way). 
 That step of parametrization is one for which, it seems to me, neither this particular 
remark in the Tractatus on its own, nor Zalabardo’s own account, make proper provision [cf. 
Floyd 2018].  For there is surely not a left-looking a-way in which the front corners may be said 
to be truly above, and a right-looking b-way in which the front corners may be said to be truly 
below one another. The a-way and the b-way are not modes of truth.  They rather reflect 
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different starting points, differing analyses, different parametrizations of what is possibly to be 
said about what is there, on the page, if one thing is said to be true, or another. Each 
parametrization erects a system, a domain of comparative possibilities and necessities, 
connections between things we may or may not say: a logical field for thought (cf. [Floyd 2010: 
sections 2-3], [Floyd 2018]).  It is the (modal) field or system of inferences that matters, not the 
“mode” of combination of the parametrization and the elements of the picture. 
 According to the Tractatus there should be only one way of being true, one logical space 
in which the totality of such parameters, which tie down structures of possibility, sameness and 
difference, works.  Wittgenstein’s cavalier remark that there are two “different facts” here, 
generated by the two parametrizations, which offer two different experiences of “seeing as”, 
appears to cut itself off from this idea, inviting the kind of cognitive/ontological account 
Zalabardo sees at work in the book.  But here, it seems to me, Wittgenstein made a kind of slip.  
He should have been speaking instead about ways of organizing what is there to be said: how it 
is we establish ways of recognizing logical implications and necessities in a system. (This 
instability became evident to him, of course, in 1929, and he arguably overreacted, insisting that 
wholly relativized notions of Satzsystem and simplicity were mandatory—another misstep on the 
way to an ultimately more stable view [Floyd 2016].) 
 In Zalabardo’s account of our judging that Pavarotti is rapping, must not the way-of-
being-combined-if-the-judgment-is-true be the same as the way-of-being-combined-if-the-
judgment-is-false?  Why look over and draw an analogy with Jay Z rapping to get to this way?  
How would this help? Wittgenstein himself holds it to be crucial that pictures that are sentences 
are internally related to their negations, so sharing a mode of combination.  But this only makes 
sense when we regard the affirmation of a sentence (a picture), not merely as a fact that holds, 
but as an opportunity to use it to affirm and thereby individuate the idea of it being the 
realization or failure of realization of a possibility of the thought’s being the case.  From there we 
see that we are capable of regarding what is affirmed as something that may or may not obtain, a 
possibility (though neither a possibilia nor a mode of truth).  This is the most fundamental idea of 
our capacities, I would argue, at work in the picturing conception of sentences in the Tractatus. 
Zalabardo writes (p. 8, n. 6): 
We can represent things pictorially as combined with one another in a certain way even if 
these things are not so combined, but there have to be other things — the constituents of the 
picture—exemplifying this same mode of combination. 
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He means here actual exemplification by some other constituents.  But now we are in a circle, 
without any force for this “having to be”.  For how can we insist that this “way” is exemplified 
somewhere?  Zalabardo thinks that the only way out of the circle will be to insist that the 
proposition (picture) itself is a fact, so that its constituents exhibit a “mode” of combination.  The 
important thing for him is that the basic ontology is that of fact, rather than things per se.  But he 
has hereby assumed that both of his unity problems have been solved, that we are safe in taking 
it that we, in putting together the picture, have in fact put constituents together in a certain way.  
But how can we know this?  Do we stipulate it?  Is it a figment of our symbolism alone?  
Clearly Wittgenstein does not want this: logical form is not arbitrary or relative to a particular 
grammar of a particular language, but must be that-which-is-in-common-to-all-that-can-be-said-
in-this-definite-way.  There is something arbitrary in every language, but what logic is concerned 
with is what is necessary, not arbitrary [TLP 3.342; cf. Shieh 2014].  It is this generality and 
comprehensiveness, the very idea of seeing in an affirmation with a sentence-picture that a 
possibility is said to be realized, that matters.  It gives substance to all of Wittgenstein’s “ifs”. 
In short, it is central to the Tractatus, despite the broad-ranging tendency among its readers--
irresolute, resolute, and otherwise--that there is a transformation of a Kantian problematic going 
on in the picture conception.  And this is ignored by Zalabardo.  A possibility that something is 
the case or is not the case cannot be “seen” in the way that we see a cup, or a table, or even a 
particular structure (realized picture or fact).  Instead we must be able to disentangle our thinking 
from the actual structure of the picture-sentence to be able to see something in terms of a system-
--ultimately step-by-step modes of procedure that may be written down and expressed.  
Analogies must be logically tethered to be logically relevant. The “metaphysical” and the 
“semantic” problems of unity are not really, not ultimately, separable from this.  And the 
Tractatus’s way of showing this is directly reflected in Wittgenstein’s sharp distinction between 
“structure” and “fact”—a distinction Zalabardo glosses over.  This underplays Wittgenstein’s 
way of offering a conception to Russell that will give him a way out.   
Russell needed a way past the “way”, and he acknowledged this.  His own language in the 
Theory of Knowledge reverts to modality at a crucial point, just when he invokes the “mode of 
combination” problem in connection with asymmetric relations.  There, discussing “A precedes 
B” vs. “B precedes A” he writes that to understand the proposition, 
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… we must have acquaintance with A and B and with the relation "preceding". It is also 
necessary to know how these three terms are meant to be combined; and this, as we say in the 
last chapter, requires acquaintance with the general form of a dual complex. But this is by no 
means enough to enable us to understand the proposition; in fact, it does not enable us to 
distinguish "A precedes B" from "B precedes A". When we were discussing relations, we said 
that, with a given relation and given terms, two complexes are "logically possible". But the 
notion of what is "logically possible" is not an ultimate one, and must be reduced to 
something that is actual before our analysis can be complete [1913: II, I, 111].  
But, if Wittgenstein is right, this reduction cannot be carried out if we are to see how truth shows 
itself in logic. 
 On Zalabardo’s account we go from representation of Jay Z rapping to the construction of 
another, false proposition.6  Zalabardo himself registers a concern, acknowledging help given by 
a referee (cf. his footnote 6): his account of how we reach the thought of Pavarotti rapping 
appears to require that there is at least one actual fact (picture) evincing a specific mode of 
combination, a specific thing actually pictured in a specific mode of combination, one that may 
not be true.  The trouble is that then that the same picture, used to affirm what is not the case, 
will be true.  But suppose we use the picture to affirm Pavarotti rapping as true (wrongly).  What 
is the connection between these possibilities of action and the situation where we deny Pavarotti 
is rapping (using the same picture)? There actually being a false elementary proposition of a 
particular form cannot be a condition of the sense (the bi-polarity) of another elementary 
proposition.  And at some point we must make sense of how to disentangle affirmation and 
denial, as acts.  Zalabardo's account leaves this out, and so the crucial Tractatus idea of 
determining internal relations among possibilities of affirmation and denial that is central to 
logic. 
 It is not the case that Wittgenstein holds that even one elementary sentence must be true. 
True and False, as Russell wrote (1912b, 55), are “extra-logical”, they do not enter logic with the 
truth (or falsity) of an elementary proposition.  The world, “determined by” the totality of facts, 
is “everything that is the case”; this “determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the 
case” [TLP 1.12].  Consider the totality of all the elementary sentences.  They are picturing facts, 
subject to affirmation and denial [Bejahen, Verneinen]7.  We might say “Yes!” to all, “No!” to 
                                               
6 I will use “sentence” in what follows, trading in Zalabardo’s alternative translation of Satz for another.  I don’t 
think this will tip the argument against Zalabardo unfairly.  But he might. 
7 Cf. [TLP 5.513]; the relations between this striking entrance of the notions of affirmation and denial late in the 
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all, or “Yes!” to some and “No!” to others.  Once we do this, the truth or falsity of all truth 
functions of these elementary propositions is settled: there is no role for further “consciousness” 
to play, even when we present collections (systems) of elementary propositions through a variety 
of different modes of expression.8  The idea that all propositions are truth functions of 
elementary propositions requires at least this much.  It also demands that we can affirm or deny, 
rightly or wrongly, each and every elementary picture-sentence, and all of them (and/or all 
subsets of them) collectively, and that we cannot both affirm and deny, say both “Yes” and 
“No”, to any one. 
We have here, in cloudy but recognizable form, a needed logical idea, that of an assignment 
of truth-values to the elementary propositions of language, one that covers all of the elementary 
things to say, one that determines, in Tractarian terms, the world as it is [cf. Zalabardo 2010: 
428].  Of course it is no part of the Tractatus—as it is of the modern idea of a truth-assignment—
that we be able to schematize our language, step outside of it, and then consider, 
metamathematically, all combinatorial possibilities of truth assignments to a fixed set of 
schematized elementary sentences. Wittgenstein is not thinking schematically about logic in this 
modern way.    Nevertheless, he is informally drawing in the proto-idea of an assignment, and 
this is no accident, if we consult Principia (as we shall shortly do).  One is invited in the 
Tractatus to ask why it could not turn out that all of the sentences we hold to be true might, in 
fact, be false, because this was a question raised by Russell in Principia.  (After all, “there are no 
pictures that are true a priori” [TLP 2.225].)   
Our going utterly and completely wrong in our affirmations would not change what is the 
case.  A proposition presents [darstellt] its sense, and its truth or falsity is constituted by the 
agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality [TLP 2.221-2.222].  This “agreement” and 
“disagreement” is nothing but the existence and non-existence of states of affairs, the existing 
“positive” and “negative” facts (the latter being what is not the case) [TLP 2.06].    
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein brought back what Russell deemed the “almost incredible” 
notion of a negative fact [Russell 1910: 153 [119]].  He worried about this incessantly in 
September 1914 and tried to eliminate it from his conception as it stood at this point.  He 
gradually came to see that what he needed to move decisively beyond the idea that a proposition 
                                               
game in TLP and Frege’s early way of expressing himself in Begriffsschrift [1879] are discussed in [Shieh 2014]. 
8 Wittgenstein names three such ways [TLP 5.501] but doesn’t say these are all there are. 
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has a Bedeutung.   This story that has been philosophically reconstructed and explored by 
Diamond [2001], though she does not quite clarify and emphasize as central the importance of 
modality as a positive issue in thinking about Wittgenstein’s relations to Russell and Frege.9  
Wittgenstein’s progress turned on the idea that the proposition is a construction, realizes a 
possibility of representing that something is or is not the case.  The sentence serves, not as an 
expression whose task is to go proxy for a fact, but instead, as an expression of a thought, the 
thought of a specific possibility of a state of things, one that either holds or does not hold. 
 
3.   Taking Russell and Wittgenstein to the End of the Line: Broader Methodological Themes 
  How might Zalabardo’s reconstruction be better developed?  
Zalabardo fails to penetrate past the .3’s in each level of the text he analyzes here.  This leads 
him to a serious underestimation of Tractarian resources that are relevant. He does not discuss 
the 5.’s or 6.’s at all.  Of course, he does not wish to, thinking that there is something 
objectionable going on in these remarks.  And yet these deeper and farther branches of the 
Tractatus’s structure of subway lines10 ⁠ carry Wittgenstein’s treatment of logic, aiming to make 
good on the claim that the only necessity is “logical” [TLP 6.37].  They serve, in the end, to 
consolidate the ultimate rationale for Wittgenstein’s view of propositions as pictures.  To me 
Zalabardo offers us a tour of the subway in the original city center, never penetrating the further 
branches of the line.  
 It is as if—to vary the metaphor used later [Wittgenstein 2009: §18]—the older, rambling 
center, where metaphysical questions live and breathe, is abstracted from the straight suburbs 
surrounding it. The ways in which these newer areas alleviate congestion and provide efficient 
means of entrance and exit, revitalizing the whole metropolis, are overlooked.  
Zalabardo is unpersuaded by certain doctrines of “unsayability” that he believes infect the 
Tractatus’s account of propositional representation.  Though he does not specify what these are, 
he takes Wittgenstein to offer us “rules” of a propositional “game” that internally fail to meet 
conditions of that game itself, making the whole idea of an account of propositional 
representation incoherent in one stroke.  I would have liked to see at least some discussion of 
                                               
9 Of course, her writings are shot through with reflections on wrong ways of conceiving modality in philosophy; cf. 
[Diamond 1991 passim]. 
10 Cf. TLP maphttp://tractatus.lib.uiowa.edu/tlp/ (accessed 12/9/2017). 
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these “rules”, for I fail to find in the Tractatus anything like this doctrinal account of 
unsayability-at-a-stroke, anything like a set of general conditions which thought must obey to be 
thought or representation.  Indeed: it is Zalabardo’s way of producing inarticulateness in his 
account of the primordiality of truth (“like this!”) that Wittgenstein was trying (successfully or 
not) to overcome.   
Wittgenstein was not willful here.  Rather than the production of a general paradox about 
representation, I suggest that he was offering a response to paradoxes inherited from Russell. 
From the beginning Russell constructed his MRTJ to handle the “systematic ambiguity of truth 
and falsehood” in the face of paradoxes emerging from discussions of “all” propositions 
[Whitehead and Russell 1910: Ch. II, s. III; Russell 1906: 46].  In Principia, where the MRTJ is 
first endorsed by Russell, we find a hierarchy of constructed levels of truth, an urging of the 
“systematic ambiguity” of the notions of “truth” and “proposition”, of the logical constants, of 
generalization.  This levelled way of handling the indefinability of truth informally but definitely 
anticipates the Tarskian approach (this is shown in connection with Gödel in [Floyd and 
Kanamori 2016: Section 1]).  Since Russell invented the idea of a “hierarchy of languages” in his 
Introduction to the Tractatus, he himself certainly deemed this cluster of issues relevant.   
As Russell fully acknowledges in Principia, this whole approach crucially depends on 
starting somewhere.  Russell is suitably guarded about this, offering an (atomic) example that, he 
says, would work in one “context” as “first truth”, but maybe not in another [Whitehead and 
Russell: 42], “fx”.11  Specifying how it is that we get on to the hierarchy in the first place is what 
I shall call, a little colorfully, the problem of “0th truth”.  It is a real problem, the really 
fundamental philosophical problem, of truth [cf. Floyd and Kanamori 2016: Sections 2-4]. 
 In Principia Russell did not distinguish, at the step of what he called “first truth”, 
between what we (following Wittgenstein) would call “atomic” or “elementary” sentences and 
truth-operationally compounded ones: instead he grouped all quantifier-free sentences (including 
all truth-functionally compounded sentences) together [Levine 2013].  He then focused on 
generality as the crucial notion forcing us up inside the hierarchy.  He spoke of it as creating the 
need, due to the paradoxes, for a next step.   If  “fx” has “first truth”, then “(x)fx” and “($x)fx” 
                                               
11 Russell writes [Whitehead and Russell: 42]: 
(This is not to assume that this would be first truth in another context: it is merely to indicate that it is the 
first sort of truth in our context.) 
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would have “second truth”.  Adding another (presumably alternated, different) quantifier would 
get us to “third truth”, and so on. 
  Like Russell, Zalabardo groups all of “first truth” together, glossing over the difference 
between truth-functionally compounded sentences and non-truth-functionally compounded 
sentences.  This, as in Principia, abstracts away from the challenges of further analysis, and so, 
getting to the most ultimate problem, the problem of 0th truth, into view.  This creates an 
ambiguity, as I have argued, making problematic Zalabardo’s account of the distinction between 
the “metaphysical” and the “semantical” problems of unity.   
 In September of 1914, when he was still holding that propositions have meanings 
[Bedeutungen], Wittgenstein himself confronted the problem: How is it possible to logically 
portray situations which do not hold (he called this “identical with” “the problem of truth” 
[Wahrheits-Problem] [1979: 6, , 24.9.14]).  There being something specific for me to be wrong 
about already raises the issue that this something bears an intrinsic relation to another something, 
the proposition’s being false, whether the proposition is or is not expressed in a quantifier-free 
sentence.  This is something we need to be able to see without comparing actual features of the 
sentences (structures, facts) concerned to see features in the manner Zalabardo proposes in his 
paper (pictures of Pavarotti singing, Jay Z rapping, and so on).  In the Tractatus this ability is 
expressed by way of the notion of an operation of negation, a formal procedure we can use, step 
by step, to construct (in its generalized Sheffer form) all propositions.  Intuition is replaced by 
construction in logic, something like in mathematics [cf. TLP 6.233]. 
 Unfortunately, contemporary philosophers of “disquotation” and “redundancy” too often 
fail to see, as Russell and Wittgenstein did, that this further analysis at the 0th level requires a 
great deal of conceptual work, if it is to be regarded as telling us anything at all about truth [cf. 
Putnam 2016].  In the Tractatus, that propositions are everywhere logically entangled with the 
“possibility” of their not-holding or holding is shown in the construction of propositions, and the 
very same structure may be used to say how reality is, and how it is not.  A picture is a structure, 
not the possibility (form) thereof.  But it may be used as a structure to affirm what is the case (or 
deny what is the case) and thereby display the relevant possibilities.  Truth-operationally 
compounded sentences individuate specific things to be said by being constructed through 
repeated, potentially iterated applications of the generalized Sheffer Stroke.  There is no room for 
doubt about its universal applicability, for it is made to construct truth-operational expressions of 
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agreement and disagreement with truth-possibilities at the atomic step. 
 The logical distinction between atomic and non-atomic propositions is thereby shown to 
be fundamental.  Atomic pictures (Sachverhalten) depict possibilities of holding or not holding, 
whereas truth-operationally constructed, negated or compounded pictures express agreements 
and disagreements with these [cf. Shieh 1914]. Logic tells me what possibilities I may or may 
not be affirming or denying (or neither) in an affirmation. 
 Wittgenstein sought, not merely to get the basic metaphysical entities into view 
(falsifying Russell’s metaphysics thereby).  He dug deeper, taking Russell’s approach (which 
occasionally availed itself of modal language, against Russell’s expressed wishes) to require a 
transformation in our understanding of how satisfactorily to articulate the primordiality of truth.  
He aimed to recast our conception of the most basic “step” into truth, something which is not 
really a step, in the end, but rather a starting point, the pre-kind idea of a “kind”, that of truth as 
such, that can be analyzed.  
 To use Russell’s word in Principia (to be quoted in a moment) the simplest truth “shows” 
in our judgments.  But how and in what way it shows, what we are to do and to say with that 
“simplest” showing, and with the idea of the simplest step into truth, our starting point, is the 
hard matter to characterize.  Wittgenstein did it analogically, by way of the idea of a structure-
sentence-picture: there is much right in Zalabardo’s account.  But an indispensible part of 
Wittgenstein’s aim in the Tractatus, left to the side by Zalabardo (as by so many others) was also 
to shift our conception of the hierarchy (of the simplicity of the starting points and the unity of 
the whole) by providing us with a unified conception of any formal procedure for constructing it 
in a step-by-step, “formal” fashion. 
In Principia Russell introduced the MRTJ by drawing a sharp contrast between perception 
(which is binary, or 2-place) and judgment (which is greater than 2-place).  This distinction, and 
not that between, e.g., a proposition and its negation, is foremost on his mind at this point.  
(Wittgenstein will of course, as we have stressed, come to show the importance of analyzing the 
relation between a proposition and its negation.)   Invoking an idea of perception as (what would 
later be called) a “success verb” [cf. Floyd and Kanamori 2016: 279, n.64],  Russell writes, 
Let us consider a complex object composed of two parts, a and b standing to each other in 
the relation R. The complex object “a-in-the-relation-R-to-b” may be capable of being 
perceived; when perceived, it is perceived as one object. Attention may show that it is 
complex; we then judge that a and b stand in the relation R. Such a judgment, being derived 
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from perception by mere attention, may be called a “judgment of perception.” This judgment 
of perception, considered as an actual occurrence, is a relation in four terms, namely a and b 
and R and the percipient. The perception, on the contrary, is a relation of two terms, namely 
“a-in-the-relation-R-to-b,” and the percipient. Since an object of perception cannot be 
nothing, we cannot perceive “a-in-the-relation-R-to-b” unless a is in the relation R to b. 
Hence a judgment of perception, according to the above definition, must be true. This does 
not mean that, in a judgment which appears to us to be one of perception, we are sure of not 
being in error, since we may err in thinking that our judgment has really been derived merely 
by analysis of what was perceived. But if our judgment has been so derived, it must be true. 
In fact, we may define truth, where such judgments are concerned, as consisting in the fact 
that there is a complex corresponding to the discursive thought which is the judgment. That 
is, when we judge “a has the relation R to b,” our judgment is said to be true when there is a 
complex “a-in-the-relation-R-to-b,” and said to be false when this is not the case. This is a 
definition of truth and falsehood in relation to judgments of this kind [my emphasis; 
[Whitehead and Russell 1910: Ch. II, s. III, 43f]].  
 
Note bene: Russell says that he defines truth here “in relation to judgments of this kind”.  Which 
kind?  This he cannot say, it is to be shown in judging distinguishing itself from perception, 
seemings-to-be-the-case.  Russell not saying whether we ever make judgments that are true, 
judgments that are “judgments of perception”.  He presupposes our capacity for this.  The whole 
teeters on the edge of a certain schematicity that is nevertheless not made explicit.  “If our 
judgment has been so derived” he writes.  Russell moves from a modal idea, that of a complex 
being “capable of being perceived” (presumably, by some possible subject) to a non-modal idea, 
that of an “actual” fact of judgment. This latter fact is regarded as a matter of successful 
“analysis” given through proper “attention”.   
Here emerges Zalabardo’s “mode of combination problem”, a problem of unity and 
mentality, but also, as I have argued, of modality, of possibility.  The issue is how we are to 
conceive becoming conscious of a “mode of combination” of a complex that can play the role of 
a proposition.  How are we to manage ever to detach Russell’s “if” and “so” in a “rational” 
cognitive manner that is somehow compelled?  This is Russell’s—and Zalabardo’s--problem.  
Thus Zalabardo is right to emphasize a tie between Russell’s conception of analysis and his 
conception of consciousness: the “mode of combination” problem is one of intentionality and its 
objects.12  In fact in every version of complexes Russell forwarded from 1903-1913, to 
                                               
12 [Zalabardo 2015: Chapter 3] reconstructs the Tractatus denial that there is a thinking subject from this problem. In 
fact---as Zalabardo surely knows---Russell is explicit about the connection between the MRTJ and mentality, not 
only in Principia, but everywhere else (cf. [Carey 2007]). It is telling that Russell only officially dropped the MRTJ 
in 1918, once he adopted neutral monism while in prison reading the American pragmatists. 
Forthcoming in Australasian Philosophical Review 
Version of 1/29/18 
 17 
understand a “proposition” one must be “acquainted” with all of its constituents: these are what 
the “proposition” is, intuitively, “about”.  The “mode of combination” problem raises the 
question whether this can be, not merely a necessary, but also a sufficient condition.  Zalabardo’s 
answer, on behalf of Wittgenstein, is No, and here we agree.  
But in the Tractatus, as I read it, it is a certain kind of expression of a possibility of 
procedure that must be filled in, rather than a mental act: a task, not an isolated analogical act of 
cognition.  The question before us, I have argued, is not whether one may rightly conceive of 
propositions as “compounds”.  Rather, we should see how Wittgenstein aimed to transform 
Russell’s understanding of the proposition’s compound nature into something more satisfactory.  
To repeat: propositions are taken to be “configurations” of things in the Tractatus [2.01, 2.03].  
At issue is how to differentiate between the notion of a “configuration” of elements and a 
“compound”.  
 It seems clear that Wittgenstein rejected from the outset—before he embraced the picture 
conception— Russell’s idea of direct, infallible, “self-evident” awareness of objects and forms.  
He replaced Russell’s notion of “acquaintance” with forms and entities with a more everyday 
understanding of the notion, the sense in which we are “acquainted” with a piece of music, a 
person, a town, a friend—something not infallible, but more or less insightful, more or less 
lending itself to accurate insight, something better than “one-sided” consideration “einseitig 
beleuchtet” to invoke Frege’s wonderful phrase [1892: 27].  We must get hold of logical richness 
and complexity, logical depth.  But this idea of depth already undercuts the sufficiency of direct 
intentional connection with singular objects that Russell was forwarding [cf. Floyd 2018]. It is 
not primarily the metaphysical idea of a whole that centrally structures the picture conception of 
sentences as facts. What was just as crucial was Wittgenstein’s aim of transforming our 
conception of the role consciousness of logical relations is to play in logic.  
I have argued that what is crucial here is that he embraced and radicalized a Russellian ideal 
of construction, emphasizing procedures, systematic modes of comparing what is the same and 
what is different in experience, perception and thought.  In the Tractatus the idea of a logical 
“feature” [Zug] depends upon the “pulling out in a train” of procedure from a structure, to revert 
to the German term’s literal meaning: something that can be written down in a formal, shareable, 
expressible step-by-step way, shown to be a configuration [Konfiguration] or “chain” [cf. TLP 
2.03].  It is the possibility of this that is stressed, and not merely our abilities in consciousness to 
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draw comparisons or discern the ultimate nature of what is actually there.   
It is not that Frege or Russell would have found Wittgenstein’s procedural ideal of analysis in 
logic problematic: they too designed Begriffschriften.  But they did not have faith in the 
method’s philosophical centrality as something central our very notion of the fundamentals of 
logic, to the idea of how truth shows up in our judging.  From the perspective on perspectives on 
truth that I am working out here on behalf of the whole Tractatus, in their philosophical 
discussions of truth, their most fundamental elucidations, Frege and Russell did not push their 
metaphors hard enough.  They missed out on a central feature of the logical, inviting needless 
philosophical arbitrariness to creep into some of their most crucial elucidations. The Tractatus is 
addressed to real problems, hard problems, problems for Frege, Russell, and everyone else: kinds 
of arbitrariness that can unwittingly show up in language, in thought, when we aim to elucidate 
fundamental logical notions.  
This point deserves further elaboration and justification in light of the texts—something I 
hope to do elsewhere.  For now I can say this much, in brief.  It is our ability to reflect upon and 
straighten out our expression of the possibility of a mode of combination that is central to our 
ability to discern logical features and relations in the Tractatus.  If there is any crucial cognitive 
ability, it must lie here.  What is central is how it is that we see through actualities to 
possibilities, possibilities that are neither modes of truth, nor objects of thought (possibilia) nor 
further propositions using the term “necessary”, but instead patterns of affirmation and denial of 
propositions captured in logical procedures, the development of modes of expression that relate 
truth-possibilities to one another systematically, in a step-by-step, formally expressible, 
hopefully recognizable way.13 This conception emerges not from deducing contradictions in 
Russell’s way of thinking---Russell did that for himself---but by instead following out Russell’s 
problems and methods, taking these seriously, and providing a different, more developed 
conception of a way out. 
The picture-conception then, insofar as it forms a direct response to Russell and Frege, 
exemplifies the Tractatus’s whole aim: to transpose or transform the Fragestellungen of certain 
philosophical questions: here, about truth [cf. Floyd 2007]. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on pictures, 
construction and operation, on the generality of form-series, came in relatively late on the road to 
                                               
13 On whether we would have to be gods to recognize these if the world turns out to be infinitely complex, see 
[Dreben and Floyd 1991]. 
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the Tractatus (September 1914 for picturing; “operations” in December 1914). This does not 
make these ideas any less fundamental to what is going on in the Tractatus.  But it does signal 
that at least some of the work they are doing moves beyond the regress arguments that may be 
found, not only in earlier remarks of Wittgenstein’s, but also in Russell. 
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